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I. Introduction 
The Homeland Investment Act (HIA) provided for a one-time tax holiday on the repatriation 
of foreign earnings by U.S.-based multinational enterprises (MNEs)1 and was passed in 2004 
as part of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). Congressmen argued that it would create 
more than 500,000 jobs over 2 years by raising investment in the United States.  Analysts at 
J.P. Morgan Securities estimated that businesses would increase capital spending by 2% to 
3% over two years.2  A confidential survey of firms indicated that they would primarily use 
the repatriated funds to pay down debt, finance capital spending, and fund research and 
development, venture capital, and acquisitions;3 some firms also stated these intentions 
publicly.  Many economists, however, argued that the tax holiday would have little impact on 
U.S. investment, R&D or employment.  The White House’s Council of Economic Advisers 
stated that “the repatriation provision would not produce any substantial economic benefits.”4  
 
In response to the HIA, repatriations of foreign earnings from affiliates to parents of U.S. 
MNEs surged.  According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. multinationals 
repatriated about $300 billion in 2005 after the HIA was passed, up sharply from an average 
of around $60 billion over the previous five years.5  The magnitude of these repatriations 
exceeded most predictions.  
 
Firms’ responses to the HIA provide an opportunity to test several hypotheses about financial 
constraints, corporate governance, and international tax policy.  The temporary tax holiday 
effectively reduced the cost to U.S. multinationals of accessing internal capital that was held 
abroad as reinvested earnings.  The framers of the Act justified the tax holiday based on the 
premise that these firms’ domestic operations were financially constrained.  If this were true, 
repatriated cash could be invested in U.S. projects that had a positive net present value for the 
                                                 
1 The term “repatriation” refers to the payment of dividends by a foreign subsidiary to its U.S. parent firm. 
2 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Economic & Policy Research report “Introducing the Homeland Investment Act,” 
May 1, 2003. 
3 Survey conducted by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and reported in their research report, “Status Report on 
Repatriation Legislation-aka the Homeland Investment Act,” September 17, 2003.  
4  Wall Street Journal, “Tax Windfall May Not Boost Hiring Despite Claims; Some Companies Plan to Use New 
Break on Foreign Profits for Debt and Other Needs,” October 13, 2004, pg. A1. 
5 Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, 
Table 7b, line 3 for distributed earnings. 
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firm based on the temporarily lower cost of internal capital but which were not profitable at 
the higher cost of external finance.  Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) review the large 
literature on financial constraints.6  There are reasons to be skeptical about the stated 
justifications for the Act because large firms are typically less constrained than small ones, 
and multinationals are generally thought to be less constrained than other firms.  In the 
presence of high repatriation tax costs, however, the domestic activities of MNEs or a subset 
of MNEs could face constraints.  Studying changes in firms’ domestic investment, 
employment, and R&D expenditures under the HIA reveals whether the domestic operations 
of U.S. multinationals were in fact financially constrained, and if the reduced tax costs of 
accessing internal funds spurred domestic activity in accordance with the stated goal of 
lawmakers.  
 
If firms are not financially constrained, then well-governed firms would return any internal 
capital accessed under the HIA to shareholders through mechanisms such as share 
repurchases or dividend payments.  In the absence of financial constraints, well-governed 
firms would choose optimal levels of investment and employment before the tax holiday, so 
they would not increase expenditures on capital and labor when the holiday occurred.  If firms 
are not well-governed, however, any internal cash accessed under the HIA could be 
squandered.  This cash would reduce the constraints on managers and give them more 
freedom to pursue projects that provide a greater private benefit than shareholder benefit—
such as raising management compensation, upgrading corporate headquarters, or increasing 
investment in low-return projects.  This possibility is discussed in Jensen (1986), and 
evidence of such behavior appears in several papers, such as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Blanchard, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), 
Bates (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  This paper analyzes the effects of the 
HIA on payouts to shareholders and tests whether corporate governance affects the extent to 
which firms returned funds to shareholders.   
 
                                                 
6 Some of the key contributions in this extensive literature include: Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), 
Blanchard, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997), and Rauh (2006).  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
discuss problems in measuring financial constraints. For evidence on financial constraints and R&D, see Hall 
(1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994). 
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Firms’ responses to the HIA also have important implications for international tax policy, 
including implications for the effects of how the United States taxes foreign source income 
and for the regulation of how repatriations are spent.  Altshuler and Grubert (2003) argue that 
U.S. multinationals are able to use tax planning strategies that allow them to effectively avoid 
repatriation taxes even in the absence of a tax holiday.  On the other hand, several papers find 
that repatriation taxes significantly distort repatriation decisions.7  Evidence that firms made 
extensive use of the HIA tax holiday  and in particular that those firms that took greatest 
advantage of the holiday had previously attempted to reduce their repatriation taxes through 
alternative strategies  would suggest that repatriation taxes do impose burdens, despite the 
availability of strategies to escape the taxes. This finding is particularly timely in view of 
current proposals to restrict U.S. firms’ ability to defer repatriation taxes.8 
 
A more general policy issue addressed in this paper is whether government regulation can 
affect firms’ spending patterns. The U.S. Treasury Department issued explicit guidelines on 
how earnings returned to the United States could be spent.  The funds had to be used for 
“permitted investments,” which included hiring U.S. workers, U.S. investment, research and 
development, and certain acquisitions. Certain uses, such as executive compensation, 
dividends, and stock redemptions, would disqualify repatriations from the holiday.  The 
literature on the “flypaper effect” suggests that regulations directing how funds are used have 
a significant impact.  More specifically, this literature finds that money tends to “stick where 
it hits”, i.e., that targeted grants have large effects on expenditures even though cash is 
fungible.9  Although most papers on the flypaper effect focus on inter-government transfers, 
Hines and Thaler (1995) review this literature and point out similar effects in the corporate 
sector.  How U.S. multinationals responded to the restrictions on the use of cash repatriated 
under the HIA provides a test of the effectiveness of these types of regulations.  
 
The empirical analysis in this paper utilizes the most extensive data available on U.S. 
multinational firms by combining information from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
                                                 
7 Papers that document an effect of taxes on repatriations include Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Desai, Foley, 
and Hines (2007). 
8 See “Obama Calls for Curbs on Offshore Tax Havens,” New York Times, May 4, 2009. 
9 For examples of papers on the flypaper effect, see Pack and Pack (1993), Knight (2002), Gordon (2004), 
Baicker and Staiger (2005), and van de Walle (2007). 
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(BEA) Survey of Direct Transactions of U.S. Reporter with Foreign Affiliate and Survey of 
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad with data drawn from Compustat, ExecuComp, and other 
sources. There are, however, two fundamental challenges in analyzing the effects of 
repatriations under the HIA: endogeneity and omitted variable bias.  Firms choose how much 
to repatriate while simultaneously making other financial decisions.  In addition, common 
omitted factors, such as levels of domestic cash flows, could affect both repatriations and 
other choices.  This paper addresses these problems by instrumenting for repatriations under 
the HIA using firm characteristics that predict which firms are more likely to receive a large 
tax benefit from HIA repatriations but that are predetermined in relation to the Act.  More 
specifically, the instruments identify firms that, prior to the HIA, faced high tax costs of 
repatriating funds and that shielded foreign income from U.S. taxation by using tax haven 
affiliates or holding companies. The first-stage results indicate that these characteristics are 
strong predictors of the extent to which firms took advantage of the HIA. 
 
The second stage results and additional evidence in this paper are inconsistent with the claim 
that the domestic operations of MNEs were financially constrained and that the tax holiday 
spurred U.S. job creation or investment.  More specifically, higher levels of repatriations were 
not associated with increased domestic capital expenditures, domestic employment 
compensation, or research and development (R&D) expenditures.  In fact, increased 
repatriations in response to the HIA had small negative, but insignificant, effects on domestic 
employment and R&D expenditures in instrumental variable specifications.  These results 
hold not only for the full sample of firms, but also for subsamples of firms that appear to be 
financially constrained and that lobbied for the Act.   
 
Additional results from the analysis of equity provisions by parent firms to their affiliates 
provide further evidence that firms did not face domestic financial constraints.  Before the tax 
holiday, firms that increased equity provisions from their parents to their affiliates repatriated 
less to the United States. Firms that increased parent equity provisions around the time of the 
tax holiday, however, had significantly higher levels of repatriations.  This pattern suggests 
that the domestic operations of U.S. MNEs were not capital constrained and were instead 
providing liquidity to affiliates.  These firms seem to have taken advantage of the HIA by 
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“roundtripping,” that is by replacing retained earnings that would be subject to high 
repatriation taxes if there were no tax holiday with new paid-in capital.    
 
Rather than being associated with increased expenditures on domestic investment or 
employment, repatriations were associated with significantly higher levels of shareholder 
payouts, mainly through share repurchases.  The instrumental variable estimates imply that a 
$1 increase in repatriations was associated with a $0.79 increase in share repurchases and a 
$0.15 increase in dividends. Also, higher levels of repatriations were not associated with 
higher levels of management compensation.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms are well-governed on average, in the sense that they paid out the cash accessed 
under the HIA and did not use it to increase executive compensation or to inefficiently 
increase the scale or scope of firm activities.  Additional results highlight the importance of 
corporate governance in shaping firm responses to the HIA.  Increased repatriations are 
associated with higher payouts to shareholders only for firms with reasonably strong 
corporate governance as measured by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).     
 
The results in this paper inform policy in three ways.  First, firms that employed strategies to 
reduce repatriation taxes tended to repatriate more under the HIA than other firms, indicating 
that it is not possible to eliminate the burden of repatriation taxes.10  Second, the results on 
governance suggest that agency issues should be considered when designing corporate tax 
policy, as also argued in Chetty and Saez (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005).  Finally, 
government regulations on how firms used the repatriated funds appear to have been 
ineffective. Although the results in this paper do not imply that firms violated the provisions 
of the HIA, it is clear that they were able to reallocate funds internally to bypass the publicly-
stated goals of the Act.   
 
The HIA has already attracted considerable scholarly attention.  Using more limited samples 
of firms and tests that do not address potential endogeneity or omitted variable problems, 
                                                 
10 Other studies of the HIA and of tax holidays provide further evidence of the effects of taxes on repatriations.  
Graham, Hanlon and Shevlin (2008a, b) provide survey evidence that taxes and accounting-expense recognition 
are important in repatriation decisions.  Albring, Dzuranin, and Mills (2005) estimate a high tax cost of the HIA, 
and De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) show theoretically how a repatriation tax holiday would increase firm 
value. 
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Baghai (2009), Blouin and Krull (2008) and Clemons and Kinney (2007) find that firms 
which repatriated or reported definite plans to repatriate during the tax holiday increased share 
repurchases more than firms that did not repatriate, a result consistent with our findings. 
Using a smaller sample drawn from the S&P 500, Brennan (2008) finds that repatriating firms 
did not return funds to shareholders through share repurchases, dividends or net debt 
buybacks.  He and Baghai (2009) also find that valuations of firms that repatriated under the 
HIA, especially those with weak corporate governance, fell around the time of its passage. 
They interpret this as evidence that investors believed that repatriated funds would be spent 
on activities that destroyed value.  In contrast, Oler, Shevlin and Wilson (2007) find that firms 
with foreign earnings in low-tax jurisdictions experienced a significant increase in stock 
prices and market value prior to the passage of the Act. Interpreting the results of these event 
studies is complicated, however, because the Act was discussed for some time before it 
became law.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes U.S. international 
tax policy and the implications of the HIA.  Section III describes the data, and Section IV 
discusses estimation issues.  Section V reports the results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. U.S. International Tax Policy 
The United States and many other countries tax the foreign income of their residents.  In order 
to avoid double taxation of foreign income, U.S. law grants tax credits for foreign income 
taxes paid abroad.  U.S. MNEs are permitted to defer U.S. tax liabilities on certain foreign 
profits until they are repatriated.  Taxes due upon repatriation are generally equal to the 
difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if earnings 
were taxed at the U.S. rate.  For example, if the U.S. tax rate is 35%, and a U.S. MNE earns 
$100 abroad and pays $20 in host country income taxes, an additional $15 would be due in 
U.S. taxes when the earnings are repatriated.  If foreign income taxes paid exceed the amount 
that would be due if earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, then no additional taxes are owed. 
 
Total U.S. tax obligations on distributed foreign earnings are determined by worldwide 
averaging.  This approach allows firms that pay tax rates above the U.S. tax rate in a 
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particular jurisdiction to use the foreign tax credits from this jurisdiction to shield income 
repatriated from low tax locations from U.S. taxation.  However, these foreign tax credits 
cannot be used to reduce tax obligations related to income earned within the United States.   
There are some limits to the extent to which firms can avoid U.S. taxation through deferral. 
Under the Subpart F provisions of the U.S. law, certain kinds of income, classified as “passive 
income,” are deemed distributed and therefore immediately taxable by the United States even 
if not repatriated.  Passive income includes interest income and dividends received from 
investment in securities. 
 
These rules provide incentives for firms to engage in avoidance behavior and suggest that 
certain kinds of firms are most likely to benefit from a tax holiday.  The tax costs of 
repatriations are higher for firms that operate abroad in low tax jurisdictions, and Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2007) show that such firms have lower repatriations. 11  Firms are often 
better off holding earnings in a low tax jurisdiction in liquid securities rather than repatriating 
them, even though earnings from these passive investments are deemed distributed and 
therefore taxable.  To illustrate this point, consider the previous example in which an 
incorporated affiliate earned $100 and pays $20 in foreign income taxes.  If the firm 
repatriates these earnings immediately, it pays an additional $15 in U.S. taxes and then can 
invest the remaining $65 in passive assets.  Any earnings associated with this investment are 
taxed at the U.S. rate.  However, if the firm does not repatriate the earnings, it can invest $80 
in the liquid security.  While Subpart F regulations require the firm to pay U.S. taxes on 
earnings associated with this investment, the firm will be better off holding cash abroad 
because by doing so it defers the repatriation taxes on the original $100 of active earnings.  
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) present evidence that such incentives are important 
in explaining the cash holdings of firms. 
 
Another common strategy to avoid repatriation taxes involves the indirect ownership of 
foreign affiliates, either through holding companies or through affiliates in tax havens that do 
                                                 
11 The early literature analyzing repatriation taxes demonstrated that they should not affect the timing of 
repatriations if the only alternatives are to repatriate or to reinvest foreign earnings in the foreign affiliate’s 
operations (Sinn (1984) and Hartman (1985)). The strategy of using foreign earnings to acquire passive assets 
that are held in the low-tax jurisdiction is analyzed by Weichenrieder (1996). 
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not impose repatriation taxes.  Under these kinds of ownership arrangements, earnings do not 
need to be returned to the United States before they are invested elsewhere around the world, 
thereby avoiding U.S. repatriation taxes.  Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2003) illustrate that holding company structures have these effects, and Desai, Foley, 
and Hines (2005) show that affiliates in tax havens are instrumental in facilitating deferral 
(whether or not they are classified as holding companies). These characteristics of U.S. 
international tax law, when combined with the research evidence, suggest that firms facing 
low tax rates abroad and firms that make use of holding company structures or tax haven 
affiliates should most value the tax holiday on repatriations. 
 
Business lobbyists had historically sought tax breaks on the repatriation of overseas profits, 
but the proposal for the HIA started to gain momentum after the 2004 repeal of a tax subsidy 
for U.S. exporters that was ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization. If this U.S. tax 
subsidy was not repealed, the European Union planned to impose escalating tariffs on U.S. 
exports.  Firms and lobbyists called for some offsetting policy change.  As the economy 
showed signs of weakness in the first half of 2004, legislators seriously began to consider a 
temporary tax holiday for repatriations, ostensibly as a way of ensuring that U.S. 
multinationals had funds to invest domestically. A particularly appealing feature of the 
proposal was that it could initially increase tax revenues, albeit balanced by lower revenues in 
future years.12   
 
On October 22, 2004, the U.S. Congress passed the AJCA into law.  One component of the 
AJCA, the HIA, was a temporary tax holiday on the repatriation of dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries, subject to a number of restrictions.13  More specifically, the HIA allowed 
companies to deduct 85% of their repatriations from additional U.S. taxes for the first taxable 
year on or after the HIA was signed.  Taxes were still due on the remaining 15% of 
repatriations, but firms continued to receive tax credits for foreign income taxes paid on these 
                                                 
12 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the HIA would raise $2.8 billion in tax revenues in fiscal year 
2005 but lose $3.3 billion over the 10-year period from 2005-2014 (Kleinbard and Driessen (2008)). 
13 Other provisions of the AJCA included: a tax deduction for domestic manufacturing companies, reducing the 
number of income baskets to calculate a firm’s credit for foreign taxes, extending “temporary” investment 
incentives for small businesses, allowing taxpayers in states with no income tax to deduct sales taxes from their 
federal taxes and a series of tax breaks to special interest groups (from tobacco farmers and cruise-ship owners to 
Native Alaskan whaling captains and bow-and-arrow makers). 
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earnings.  For example, if a U.S. multinational earned $100 abroad and paid $20 in host 
country income taxes, under the HIA 85% of the foreign earnings would be exempt from U.S. 
repatriation taxes and the firm would only need to pay 15% in U.S. taxes on the remaining 
$15 in earnings.  The firm’s repatriation tax burden would therefore be only $2.25 (=$15 x 
15%) under the Act as opposed to $15 (=$100 x 15%) without the Act.  If companies did not 
take advantage of this benefit by the end of their accounting year after the HIA was passed, 
the lower tax rate was not available for future years.  
 
U.S. repatriations only qualified for this tax holiday if they met several criteria. First, 
repatriations had to be paid in cash.  This required foreign subsidiaries that had already 
invested their earnings in real assets and had low cash reserves to raise cash.  Second, 
qualifying repatriations could not exceed the greater of (a) $500 million, (b) the earnings 
reported as permanently reinvested on the last audited financial statements filed on or before 
June 30, 2003, or (c) the amount the firm had historically repatriated from its foreign 
subsidiaries.  This amount of qualifying repatriations was also reduced by the total debt 
outstanding from the foreign subsidiary to related parties and by the amount of the increase in 
related-party debt between the U.S. firm and its foreign subsidiary.  These last qualifications 
were intended to prevent companies from borrowing abroad or from their U.S. parent 
companies in order to fund repatriations at the lower tax rate.  
 
Finally, repatriations had to be used for certain domestic activities in accordance with a 
domestic investment plan in order to qualify for the tax holiday.  The investment plan had to 
be approved by the company’s president, CEO, or a comparable official before the 
repatriations were paid, and then subsequently approved by the company’s board of directors 
or management or executive committee.  Investments that were “permitted uses” for the 
repatriated funds included: hiring and training domestic workers, domestic infrastructure and 
capital investments, research and development, financial stabilization (including debt 
repayment) for the purposes of U.S. job retention or creation, certain acquisitions of business 
entities with U.S. assets, advertising and marketing, and acquisition of rights to intangible 
property.  Expenditures that were explicitly not permitted uses for repatriations receiving the 
tax holiday were: executive compensation, intercompany transactions, dividends and other 
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shareholder distributions, stock redemptions, portfolio investments, debt instruments, and tax 
payments.  Some economists, such as Clausing (2005), questioned the effectiveness of 
specifying “permitted uses” for repatriations. She argues that money is fungible and firms 
could simply relabel existing projects that met the qualifying criteria as “new” to qualify for 
the tax deduction and then have the freedom to use the repatriated cash in any way.  
 
Even after the HIA was passed in October 2004, considerable uncertainty existed about 
important details such as what funds were eligible and how repatriations under the tax holiday 
could be spent.  As a result, many firms discussed the possibility of using the repatriation tax 
holiday in their 2004 annual filings but did not commit to specific actions.  This uncertainty 
was resolved in a series of clarifying documents released by the U.S. Treasury Department in 
late 2004 and early 2005.14  As a result, most companies used this tax holiday in 2005 even 
though they knew about it in 2004.  This provided parent firms with an opportunity to send 
cash abroad in the form of new paid-in capital that could replace retained earnings that were 
subsequently repatriated, a practice referred to as “roundtripping.”  
 
III. Data 
Analyzing how firms responded to the repatriation tax holiday requires combining data from 
several sources.  Annual information on repatriations and on U.S. MNE activity from 1996 to 
2005 is drawn from the results of two surveys conducted by the BEA.  The first of these is the 
Survey of Direct Transactions of U.S. Reporter with Foreign Affiliate, which provides 
information on annual repatriations from 1996 to 2005 by U.S. MNEs.  A U.S. MNE is the 
combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made a direct investment abroad, called the 
U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate.  In the 
regression analysis, repatriations are scaled by beginning-of-period consolidated firm assets.  
This survey of transactions captures not only repatriation data but also other direct 
transactions between the U.S. operations and foreign affiliates of U.S. MNEs.  It tracks new 
flows of equity from parent companies to their affiliates and allows for analysis of whether 
                                                 
14 On December 21, 2004 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a document to provide 
guidance for firms intending to repatriate dividends under the HIA. The U.S. Treasury Department issued a 40-
page document providing guidance in January of 2005 and fact sheets with additional guidance in January and 
May of 2005. 
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firms that injected new paid-in capital also repatriated retained earnings, or engaged in 
“roundtripping.” 
 
Figure 1 uses the publicly available aggregates from the BEA data to show total repatriations 
around the time of the HIA.  Repatriations surged from an average of $62.2 billion per year 
from 2000-2004 to $298.7 billion in 2005 under the tax holiday, before falling back to $91.1 
billion in 2006.15 
 
The second BEA dataset is drawn from the BEA Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 
which captures financial and operating information for both the parent companies and foreign 
affiliates of U.S. multinationals.16  These data include information on the industry and 
location of each affiliate, as well as firm-level information on some outcome variables that are 
used to analyze responses to the HIA. These data are currently available through 2005.  Firms 
are required to report information on their capital expenditures and employment compensation 
in the United States, as well as on parent firm liabilities. In the analysis below, investment, 
employment compensation, and changes in parent liabilities are scaled by beginning-of-period 
consolidated assets.17  This dataset also contains information to create one of the instruments 
used for estimation and discussed in more detail in Section IV: information on whether MNE 
affiliates are structured as holding companies or are located in tax havens.   
 
Two additional datasets, Compustat and ExecuComp, are the sources of several other 
outcome variables in the analysis. Research and development (R&D) expenditures (data item 
46), net property, plant and equipment (data item 8), dividends (data item 127), and 
repurchases of stock (data item 115) are each drawn from Compustat.  These are scaled by 
beginning-of-period consolidated assets, which are also measured using Compustat (data item 
6).  The R&D and net property, plant and equipment variables capture worldwide levels of 
                                                 
15 Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis website, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Table 7b, 
line 3.  2006 data are preliminary. 
16 The forms that firms are required to complete vary depending on the year, size of the parent and affiliate, and 
the U.S. parent’s ownership stake. The most extensive data are collected in benchmark years – 1999 and 2004.  
BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when only certain 
affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  Only reported data are used in this paper’s analysis. 
Additional information on the BEA data can be found in Mataloni (2003). 
17 All scaled variables are winsorized at the 0.25% level in each tail. 
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activity.  Missing values for R&D expenditures are assumed to be zero.  ExecuComp is the 
source of data on total CEO compensation, including salary, bonus, and the value of stock and 
option grants.  Like many other variables, CEO compensation is scaled by beginning-of-
period firm consolidated assets. 
 
Compustat data are also used to create the other instrument for repatriations and to compute 
the control variables.  The second instrument measures the tax costs of repatriating foreign 
earnings and is defined in Section IV.  Firm leverage, one of the controls, is measured as the 
ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Firm investment 
opportunities are controlled for using a proxy for Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the book 
value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to 
the book value of firm assets.  The final controls, firm cash holdings and firm profitability, are 
measured as consolidated cash and consolidated net income, respectively, both as a ratio to 
consolidated assets.  
 
Finally, the analysis also employs firm-level measures of financial constraints, lobbying 
activity, and governance drawn from a variety of sources.  Three proxies for financial 
constraints are taken from Compustat.  The Kaplan-Zingales index is estimated following 
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) by using the coefficient estimates from Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997).18  The bottom one-third of firms based on this index is classified as financially 
constrained.  Firms are classified as constrained using payout data if they do not pay 
dividends or repurchase shares in 2004. They are classified as constrained based on bond 
rating data if their 2004 S&P long-term debt rating is below BBB or if they do not have a 
rating in 2004.  One potential limitation of these measures of constraints is that they are 
typically used to characterize constraints faced by firms as consolidated entities, while the 
HIA was intended to alleviate domestic constraints of firms that faced high tax costs of 
accessing liquidity held abroad.  This issue is discussed further in Section V. 
 
                                                 
18 The index is calculated as: KZit  = 1.002 CFit /Ait_1  39.368 DIVit  /Ait_1   1.315 Cit / Ait_1  + 3.139 LEVit  + 
0.283 Qit; where CFit/Ait_1 is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ait_1 is cash dividends over assets;  Cit/Ait_1 is 
cash balances over assets; LEVit is leverage; and Tobin’s q is the market value of equity (price times shares 
outstanding from CRSP) plus assets minus the book value of equity all over assets. All variables used to 
calculate the index are winsorized at the 1 percent level. 
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Lobbying activities are measured by two variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm was a member of the Homeland Investment Coalition (HIC). The HIC was a group 
of firms and organizations formed with the sole purpose of lobbying to reduce the tax rate on 
U.S. repatriations.  The second measure is political contributions by each firm’s political 
action committee to key politicians directly responsible for crafting the HIA tax legislation, 
namely members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees.19  These 
data are from the Federal Election Commission website (www.fec.gov).  Because it is 
impossible to identify which contributions were targeted specifically at reducing the tax rate 
on repatriations, the analysis uses total contributions in 2003-2004 as well as the difference in 
contributions from 2003-2004 versus 2000-2001 in order to isolate any change from baseline 
contributions that occurred during the period when the tax holiday was under discussion.  The 
data show that political contributions from firms to these two key tax-writing committees 
increased from $16.6 million in 2000-2001 to $20.7 million in 2003-2004.  Firm governance 
is measured using the index created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the complete data set created by the merger of this 
information from the two BEA surveys, Compustat, ExecuComp, and the information on 
lobbying and governance. In the full sample of 924 firms in 2005, 261 firms repatriated 
foreign earnings.  
 
IV. Estimation and First-Stage Results 
The empirical analysis in this paper exploits differences in how the HIA affects the tax costs 
of repatriating across firms to explore how firms respond when they face lower costs of 
accessing one type of internal capital.  This section discusses the estimation strategy and the 
next section tests for effects on several outcome variables, including domestic capital 
expenditures, domestic employment compensation, R&D expenditures, parent leverage, firm 
expansion, CEO compensation, dividends to shareholders, and share repurchases.    
 
                                                 
19 Political contributions include dollar contributions plus the estimated dollar value of “in kind” contributions 
and “independent expenditures on behalf of candidate.” The data do not include contributions from individuals, 
“friends of” committees, or issue groups. The resulting data set has information on over 63,000 contributions to 
members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees from 1999 through 2006. 
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A simple OLS specification to estimate the impact of dividend repatriations on each of these 
outcome variables would take the following form: 
 
Vit = βRit + Xitγ + μi + δt + εit  ,  (1) 
 
where Vit measures the outcome variable of interest for firm i in year t, Rit is repatriations by 
firm i in year t, Xit is a vector of controls, μi is a firm effect, δt is a year effect, and εit is the 
error term.  In order to control for correlations that might be induced by changes in firm size 
through time, the outcome variables, repatriations, and control variables are scaled.  
Specifically, repatriations and all measured outcome variables are scaled by beginning-of-
period consolidated firm assets.  
 
This general estimating framework has two potential problems, endogeneity and omitted 
variable bias, either of which could cause OLS estimates of β to be biased downwards or 
upwards.  For example, an omitted variable such as domestic cash flows could bias estimates 
of β downward. If domestic earnings were high, this could lead to an increase in domestic 
investment or share repurchases while simultaneously reducing the need to repatriate 
dividends from abroad.  Endogeneity could be a concern because firms might simultaneously 
make choices about repatriations and other financial policies.  For example, plans for high 
levels of domestic capital expenditures could require repatriations, causing a positive 
correlation between domestic capital expenditures and repatriations.  The challenge of 
identifying causality is highlighted by the approaches taken in recent papers that analyze firm 
responses to the HIA.  Blouin and Krull (2008) regress measures of firm payouts on 
repatriations, while Clemons and Kinney (2007) regress repatriations on measures of payouts 
and other outcomes. 
 
These problems of omitted variables and endogeneity can be addressed by instrumenting for 
Rit.  This can be accomplished by using characteristics that are predetermined in relation to 
the enactment of the law and that identify firms that were likely to place the greatest value on 
the tax holiday interacted with a dummy that is equal to one in 2005, the year of the tax 
holiday. Otherwise it is equal to zero.  This approach effectively isolates firms that 
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experienced the largest decrease in the costs of accessing earnings retained abroad.  First-
stage tests reveal if repatriations in 2005 did reflect a response to the tax incentive in the HIA, 
and second-stage tests reveal how firms that experienced the largest decreases in the costs of 
accessing retained earnings abroad altered their behavior, relative to other firms.  This 
identification approach also has the advantage of making it unlikely that the estimated effects 
of repatriations pick up the effect of other provisions of the AJCA or other events in 2005. 
 
As the discussion of U.S. international tax policy in Section II illustrates, firms that should 
place the highest value on a repatriation tax holiday are those that (a) face lower corporate tax 
rates abroad and (b) have an affiliate that is a holding company or in a tax haven.  The first 
instrument is constructed by interacting a dummy for 2005 with an indicator that captures the 
tax cost of repatriating earnings.  These tax costs are calculated using Compustat data by 
subtracting foreign taxes paid (data item 64) from the product of a firm’s foreign pretax 
income (data item 273) and the U.S. statutory tax rate, with the maximum of this difference or 
zero scaled by total firm assets.  Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) describe this 
measure in more detail and show that it explains differences in the extent to which U.S. based 
firms hold cash abroad.  The indicator is equal to one if the parent’s foreign tax burden 
exceeded the median value for the sample in 2004.  The second instrument is intended to 
capture whether firms have structures that allow them to relocate earnings among foreign 
countries without triggering repatriation taxes.  Existing research indicates that firms often use 
holding companies or affiliates in tax havens to accomplish this objective.  The second 
instrument is therefore constructed by interacting a dummy for 2005 with an indicator 
variable equal to one if the U.S. parent has an affiliate that is located in a tax haven or is a 
holding company.20  This indicator is based on organizational structure as it existed in 2004, 
prior to repatriations under the HIA.  
 
This estimation approach imposes certain exclusion restrictions.  First, levels of foreign taxes 
paid and foreign earnings in 2004 are assumed to be exogenous to the repatriation decision.  
                                                 
20 Holding company affiliates are affiliates with an international survey industry code 5512.  These affiliates 
allow U.S. parent companies to indirectly own affiliates elsewhere, thereby facilitating the deferral of U.S. taxes.  
Countries are identified as tax havens based on the definition in Hines and Rice (1994).  Affiliates based in tax 
havens often perform other activities and are not classified as holding companies even though they are used in 
chains of ownership that facilitate deferral.  
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These are primarily driven by the location of foreign investments and economic conditions 
and tax policy in those locations, factors that are unlikely to be jointly determined with 
repatriations.  Second, the use of tax haven affiliates and holding company affiliates in 2004 is 
also assumed to be exogenous to the repatriation decision.  These structures take a 
considerable amount of time to establish, so this assumption seems reasonable. 
 
Figure 2 graphs mean repatriations for firms defined as having either low or high benefits 
from the tax holiday using these two instruments.  More specifically, firms are defined as 
having high benefits from the tax holiday if they (a) face lower corporate tax rates abroad and 
(b) have an affiliate that is a holding company or in a tax haven.  Firms that do not meet these 
criteria are defined as having low benefits from a tax holiday.  The sample includes the 
balanced panel of firms for which data are available from 2001 to 2005.  The figure shows 
little difference in average repatriations between the two types of firms from 2001 through 
2004.  In 2005, however, firms classified as having higher benefits from the tax holiday 
significantly increased mean repatriations from $23.4 million in 2004 to $122.0 million in 
2005.  In sharp contrast, firms assessed as having lower benefits from the tax holiday based 
on the two instruments had only a small increase in mean repatriations, with repatriations 
increasing from $17.2 million in 2004 to $31.9 million in 2005.  This provides preliminary 
evidence that the instruments successfully identify firms that saw the largest increase in 
repatriations under the HIA. 
 
To more formally test the strength of these instruments, Table 2 reports first-stage regressions. 
Column 1 presents results of regressing the instruments on dividend repatriations scaled by 
lagged consolidated assets with no controls.  The specification in column 2 includes the full 
set of controls.  All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The tables report the 
within-firm R2 and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that have been adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. In each specification the coefficients on the instruments are 
positive and highly significant, implying that firms with a high tax cost of repatriating 
earnings and firms that have an affiliate located in a tax haven or classified as a holding 
company increased repatriations significantly more than other firms in 2005.  The last row of 
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Table 2 provides the results of Wald tests for the significance of the instruments.  Following 
Stock and Yogo (2005), the F-statistics imply that the instruments are not weak. 
 
The fact that firms decided to take advantage of the tax holiday to repatriate such large 
amounts of cash to the United States, and that those firms that repatriated the most were those 
firms likely to face the highest tax costs of repatriation prior to the holiday, indicates that the 
repatriation tax does affect the allocation of cash within the firm.21  Without repatriation 
taxes, firms would return more of their foreign earnings to the United States. 
 
V. Firms’ Responses to the HIA  
A. Domestic and Firm-wide Responses 
Table 3 presents results of tests of the impact of repatriations on U.S. capital expenditures, 
U.S. employment compensation, and R&D.  This table and several that follow present two 
specifications for each outcome variable.  The first is based on equation (1) and is similar to 
those used in previous studies of the impact of the HIA.  The second is an instrumental 
variables (IV) specification that uses the two instruments for repatriations.  Both 
specifications include firm and year fixed effects and report heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 is U.S. capital expenditures scaled by 
lagged firm consolidated assets.  The 0.0212 coefficient on repatriations in column 1 is small 
in magnitude and insignificant.  It implies that increases in repatriations are not significantly 
correlated with increases in domestic capital expenditures over the sample period.  In the IV 
specification in column 2, the coefficient on repatriations is close to zero and remains 
insignificant.  This estimate implies that those firms that, because of their characteristics, 
repatriated an extra $1 of earnings from abroad under the HIA invested less than one cent 
                                                 
21 The large response suggests that for many firms, the effective U.S. tax burden on foreign income exceeds the 
5.25% rate available during the holiday (adjusted appropriately for foreign tax credits). However, it does not 
reveal how much larger the burden is and so is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that the effective U.S. 
tax burden on foreign income is quite low (e.g. Grubert and Mutti (2001)). Also, for the same reason, it is not 
necessarily the case that the tax holiday provided a large windfall gain to U.S. MNEs or their shareholders. The 
gain only reflects the difference between the prior effective tax burden and the 5.25% HIA rate (adjusted for 
foreign tax credits) and so may be quite small (as suggested by the relatively small estimates of the long-run 
revenue loss (Kleinbard and Driessen (2008)). 
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more domestically.  The small coefficient and the standard error of 0.1272 rule out the 
possibility that increased repatriations have a large positive effect on domestic investment. 
 
These specifications include controls for the determinants of investment that are standard in 
previous work.  The coefficient on leverage is negative, as in Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) 
and other studies.  The coefficient on lagged Tobin’s q is positive, as is the coefficient on 
lagged profitability.  Lagged cash is insignificant in explaining investment. 
 
The specifications in columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 repeat these tests, analyzing changes in 
U.S. employment compensation and levels of R&D spending, both scaled by lagged 
consolidated assets.  None of the coefficients on repatriations is significant, and those in the 
IV specifications are negative.  Alternative measures of employment yield similar results, 
including U.S. employee compensation less CEO compensation scaled by lagged consolidated 
assets or the change in U.S. employment scaled by lagged consolidated firm employment.  
These results, along with those on U.S. capital expenditures, indicate that the decreased costs 
of accessing earnings retained abroad under the HIA did not increase domestic employment, 
investment, or R&D.  
 
Table 4 repeats this analysis for three other measures of firm activity.  The dependent variable 
in the first two specifications is the change in parent liabilities scaled by lagged consolidated 
assets.  The coefficients on repatriations in the OLS and IV specifications are again 
insignificant, therefore providing no evidence that firms that increased repatriations under the 
HIA paid down debt and engaged in financial stabilization.  Although firms do not appear to 
have increased their scale through capital expenditures, they might have done so through 
acquisitions.  The specifications in columns 3 and 4 attempt to capture this possibility by 
analyzing changes in consolidated net property, plant and equipment.  The OLS and IV results 
indicate that firms did not respond to the HIA by significantly expanding their scale.  The last 
two columns test if repatriations had an effect on CEO compensation, measured by the level 
of CEO compensation scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Unlike the other outcome 
variables considered in Tables 3 and 4, CEO compensation was not a “permitted use” for 
repatriations under the HIA guidelines set by the U.S. Treasury.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 
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show that there was also no significant impact of higher repatriations on CEO compensation 
according to either estimation technique.22   
 
The tests presented in Table 5 analyze the effects of repatriations on firm payouts to 
shareholders defined as the sum of dividends and share repurchases.  The coefficient on 
repatriations is positive and marginally significant in explaining payouts scaled by lagged 
assets in the OLS specification in column 1.  The IV results in column 2, however, suggest 
that the impact of repatriations under the HIA on payouts is larger and statistically significant.  
This estimate implies that a $1 increase in repatriations under the HIA spurred a $0.92 
increase in payouts to shareholders. 
 
In order to understand better the relation between repatriations and shareholder payouts, 
columns 3 through 6 of Table 5 repeat the analysis in columns 1 and 2, but break payouts into 
its two components: dividends and share repurchases.  The coefficients on repatriations are 
positive in each column but only significant at the 5% level for the IV results for share 
repurchases.  This indicates that the main effect of higher repatriations on payouts occurred 
through increased share repurchases instead of increased dividend payments.  Moreover, the 
0.7893 coefficient on repatriations in column 6 suggests that a $1 increase in repatriations 
under the HIA increased repurchases by $0.79.  This series of results suggests that the primary 
domestic impact of the repatriations under the HIA tax holiday was to increase share 
repurchases. This use of the repatriations was not one of the political justifications for the 
holiday and was explicitly specified as not being a “permitted use” of the cash repatriated 
under the lower tax rate. 
 
Two aspects of the results in Table 5 deserve comment.  First, the OLS estimates of the effect 
of repatriations are considerably smaller than the IV results.  As explained in Section IV, the 
OLS results could be biased downward for a number of reasons.  For example, domestic cash 
flows are not observed, and if payouts were higher and repatriations were lower when these 
flows are higher, this set of relationships would generate a negative bias on the repatriation 
                                                 
22 This measure of executive compensation does not incorporate the potential indirect effects of repatriations on 
executives’ income or wealth through changes in dividends, share repurchases, or share prices. 
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coefficient.  The inclusion of year and firm fixed effects also has a large impact on estimates 
in the OLS specifications.  They absorb most of the variation in repatriations, leaving little 
scope to identify any effects. In contrast, the IV specifications identify effects using 
heterogeneity in 2005 repatriations that is induced by differences in how firms responded to 
the HIA. When firm and year fixed effects and controls are omitted from the OLS 
specification, the coefficient on repatriations is larger; a simple OLS regression of payouts on 
repatriations, both scaled by lagged consolidated assets, with no controls or firm and year 
fixed effects yields a coefficient estimate of 0.4882 on repatriations with a standard error of 
0.0811. 
 
Second, although the two forms of shareholder payouts analyzed in Table 5—share 
repurchases and dividends—are equivalent in simple models of the firm without taxes and 
with perfect information, it is not surprising that firms chose to return the repatriated cash to 
shareholders mainly through share repurchases instead of dividends.  The ability to access 
foreign cash at a lower cost was transitory. Because share repurchases do not imply as much 
of a commitment to make regular distributions as dividend payments, firms would have been 
more likely to respond to this temporary change by repurchasing shares instead of paying 
dividends.23  
 
The fact that firms increased payouts to shareholders primarily through repurchases rather 
than dividends also suggests that this behavior was not simply a delayed response to the 2003 
dividend tax cut. In 2003, Congress enacted the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act, reducing the tax rate on most dividend income to 15%. Chetty and Saez (2005) show that 
this reform led to a substantial increase in dividend payments by U.S. firms. The payout 
response to the HIA appears to be a distinct phenomenon, however, as it primarily took the 
form of repurchases rather than dividends. 
 
                                                 
23 Lintner (1956) and subsequent work indicates that firms select levels of dividend payments that can be 
sustained. Also, since paying dividends requires making a formal announcement, while repurchasing shares does 
not, firms may have preferred to return the cash to shareholders in a manner which avoided having to make a 
formal announcement that could draw attention to this prohibited use of the funds. 
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Taken together, the results in tables 3-5 suggest that repatriations did not alleviate any 
financial constraints.  Firms that valued the tax holiday the most and took greatest advantage 
of it did not increase domestic investment or employment, instead returning virtually all of the 
cash they repatriated to shareholders. 24  This behavior is consistent with simple models of the 
firm which show that if firms are not capital constrained and are well-governed, they will 
return excess cash to shareholders.  Managers do not appear to have used the repatriated cash 
to increase management compensation, acquisitions, or investment or to have taken any 
actions that are symptomatic of certain types of agency problems.  Closer examination of the 
types of firms that chose to repatriate and analysis of how different kinds of firms responded 
to the HIA offers further insight on these issues. 
 
B. Further Evidence on Financial Constraints  
The previous section shows that firms did not increase domestic investment when they were 
able to access retained earnings abroad at lower costs, a finding which is inconsistent with the 
view argued by many advocates of the HIA that firms were financially constrained.  To 
further explore the validity of this view, this section extends this analysis by considering the 
prevalence of financial constraints among U.S. multinationals. It analyzes if such constraints 
affected investment responses to the HIA and examines if firms engaged in “roundtripping.”   
 
If U.S. MNEs were not financially constrained at the time of the HIA, they should have been 
able to raise new capital at a reasonable cost if they needed domestic liquidity; they would not 
be reliant on capital held abroad.  Table 6 presents statistics on the prevalence of financial 
constraints among three sets of firms: the full set of Compustat firms and the subsets of 
multinational and non-multinational firms.  These statistics are computed using 2004 
Compustat data, and multinationals are defined as those firms that report pretax foreign 
income (data item 273).  The three measures of constraints, defined in Section III, are based 
on the Kaplan-Zingales index, whether or not the firm makes payouts to shareholders, and the 
                                                 
24 Redmiles (2008) and several press accounts indicate that the beneficiaries of the HIA were concentrated in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Removing firms in this industry does not alter the main results. It has also been widely 
reported that repatriations may have been highly skewed, with several firms repatriating more than $10 billion.  
Removing these firms from the sample also does not change the key findings discussed in this paper. 
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firm’s credit rating.  For each of these measures, multinationals appear less constrained than 
other firms in Compustat. 
 
A substantial fraction of multinationals are classified as being constrained using each 
measure, and these firms might have increased investment in response to the HIA.  
Alternatively, common measures of financial constraints may not be appropriate for 
measuring if MNEs were domestically constrained because of the tax costs of accessing 
foreign earnings.  It is possible that firms that lobbied extensively for the Act were financially 
constrained domestically in a way that is difficult to observe using consolidated firm data. 
These firms may have responded to the tax holiday in a manner that is consistent with the 
stated intentions of lawmakers.  
 
The analysis presented in Table 7 considers these possibilities by repeating the test presented 
in Column 2 of Table 3.  The top panel shows results splitting firms into those that are 
classified as being constrained or unconstrained according to each of the three measures of 
financial constraints.  The table only reports the key coefficient estimates on repatriations. 
The estimates indicate that no matter which measure of financial constraints is used, firms 
classified as being constrained did not significantly increase U.S. investment—the same result 
as for the full sample of firms. Repeating this analysis to test for effects on U.S. employment 
compensation and R&D expenditures yields the same finding.  Repatriations under the HIA 
are not associated with increased domestic investment, employment or R&D activity, even for 
U.S. multinational companies that appear to be financially constrained.25  
 
Many firms lobbied extensively for a lower tax on repatriations, and as part of this lobbying 
effort, they claimed they would use the repatriations to increase investment and R&D and hire 
workers.  For example, the “Homeland Investment Coalition” (HIC) wrote a letter to the 
Chairman of the key tax-writing committee in the House of Representatives and argued that a 
tax holiday on repatriations would “benefit the U.S. economy by: increasing domestic 
                                                 
25 Unreported tests show that firms classified as being constrained repatriated significantly less during the 
holiday than other firms.  This finding is consistent with results in Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) 
which indicate that the repatriations of constrained firms exhibit little sensitivity to tax considerations. 
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investment in plant, equipment, R&D and job creation...”26  To test whether these firms may 
have been constrained in a way not captured by traditional measures, the bottom panel of 
Table 7 repeats the analysis in the top panel of the table, but divides the sample of firms in 
three different ways based on their lobbying activities. Columns 1 and 2 present results for 
firms that were and were not members of the HIC—the coalition formed with the sole purpose 
of lobbying to reduce the tax rate on U.S. repatriations. Columns 3 and 4 present results for 
subsamples created on the basis of whether the firm’s PAC made any contributions to the 
members of the Senate or House tax writing committees, and columns 5 and 6 present results 
for subsamples based on whether firms increased their contributions to these tax-writing 
committees in 2003-2004 (when the HIA was being debated) relative to their 2000-2001 
contributions.  For each subsample, the estimated effects of repatriations on domestic 
investment are insignificant.  No matter which of the measures of lobbying is utilized, 
repatriations in response to the holiday by firms that lobbied for the HIA did not significantly 
increase investment in the United States.27    
 
A final test of the extent to which firms were financially constrained involves analyzing the 
relation between repatriations from affiliates to parents and provisions of new paid-in equity 
capital from parents to affiliates before and during the tax holiday.  If the domestic operations 
of U.S. multinationals were financially constrained around the time of the tax holiday, 
repatriations should be negatively correlated with infusions of new equity capital to foreign 
affiliates.  If firms reinvested earnings abroad in illiquid assets prior to the HIA, however, 
they might decide to change the financing of these assets by increasing paid-in capital and 
repatriating retained earnings. This would generate a positive correlation between 
repatriations of new capital and equity infusions around the time of the holiday. 
 
Table 8 presents the results of tests for a relationship between repatriations and equity 
provisions from U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates, both scaled by lagged 
consolidated firm assets.  The specification in column 1 regresses repatriations in a particular 
                                                 
26 Letter to the Honorable Bill Thomas, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, written by the Homeland Investment Coalition on March 21, 2003. 
27 This analysis yields similar results if the dependent variable is U.S. employment compensation or R&D 
expenditures. 
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year on a dummy equal to one if the parent provided equity to its affiliate in that year and this 
same variable interacted with a dummy variable for the year 2005.  The analysis points out 
correlations rather than illustrating causality.  The negative but insignificant coefficient on the 
Positive Equity Provision Dummy suggests that during all years except for the tax holiday, 
firms in which U.S. parents increased their equity investment in affiliates abroad repatriated 
less earnings.  The positive and significant coefficient on the Positive Equity Provision 
Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy, however, shows that in 2005 the relationship 
between new parent equity infusions abroad and repatriations was positive and significantly 
different from that in previous years.   
 
Column 2 of Table 8 repeats the same regression with the four standard control variables used 
in the other regressions, and columns 3 and 4 report the same regressions except measure 
equity provisions from the U.S. parent to the foreign affiliate in the current and prior year 
instead of just the current year.  In column 4, the coefficient on the Positive Equity Provision 
Dummy is now negative and significant, and the coefficient on this dummy interacted with 
the 2005 Dummy is positive and significant.  An F-test reveals that the sum of these 
coefficients is also positive and significant.  These results imply that U.S. multinationals were 
engaging in “roundtripping”; they were injecting capital from their U.S. parents into their 
foreign affiliates just as they were repatriating funds to the U.S. from their foreign affiliates at 
the lower tax rate.  Firms that had domestic operations that were financially constrained 
would not have had funds to invest as new equity abroad. Moreover, the magnitude of this 
roundtripping could have been large.  The firms that repatriated $259 billion in 2005 injected 
$104 billion into affiliates abroad over the 2004-2005 period.  
 
C. Further Evidence on Governance 
Examining how different kinds of firms responded to the HIA also provides information on 
the role of corporate governance.  Agency theory suggests that firms which are poorly 
governed could use the cash accessed at a lower cost during the tax holiday in ways that do 
not maximize the return to shareholders.  Such cash could reduce constraints on managers and 
give them more freedom to pursue projects that provide private benefits.  Even if less well-
governed firms did not spend the repatriated cash immediately, they would be more likely to 
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retain the cash instead of paying it out to shareholders, possibly in order to have more 
freedom to pursue projects that do not maximize value in the future.  
  
To test if firm governance affected how firms responded to the tax holiday, Table 9 presents 
results of some of the main specifications estimated on subsamples of firms that are classified 
as having weak or strong governance.  Firms are classified as having weak governance if their 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) g index, as measured in 2004, is equal to or greater than 
12, which is roughly the seventy-fifth percentile of this index.  This subset therefore captures 
firms that appear to have particularly poor governance.  Firms are classified as having strong 
governance if their index in 2004 has a value of 11 or less.  Columns 1 and 2 present results of 
the specification presented in column 2 of Table 3 that explains U.S. capital expenditures 
scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  The estimated coefficient on repatriations is 
insignificant for firms with weak and strong governance, although it is larger in magnitude for 
poorly governed firms (0.2921 as opposed to 0.0042).  The results in columns 3 and 4 
illustrate that repatriations also do not have a significant effect on CEO compensation for 
either set of firms.  
 
The results in columns 5 and 6, however, show a difference between the two subsamples in 
the relationship between repatriations and payouts.  More specifically, firms with reasonably 
strong governance have a significant positive effect of repatriations under the HIA on 
payouts, while firms with weak governance have an insignificant and approximately zero 
effect of repatriations on payouts. These findings imply that poorly-governed firms did not 
respond to the HIA by returning funds to shareholders; this effect is only apparent among 
better-governed firms.  Although these results do not pinpoint what happened to funds that 
were repatriated by firms with weak governance, they are consistent with the hypothesis that 
when well-governed firms that are not financially constrained gain access to an internal 
source of cash, they return it to shareholders. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes how firms responded to the temporary reduction in the tax costs of 
repatriating foreign earnings under the Homeland Investment Act and reaches four main 
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conclusions.  First, the domestic operations of U.S. multinationals were not financially 
constrained at the time of the Act.  The ability to access an internal source of capital at a 
lower cost did not boost domestic investment, employment, or R&D.  Statements by 
Congressmen and lobbyists indicate that they believed that reducing repatriation taxes would 
increase the domestic activities of U.S. MNEs.  This paper’s results clearly show that the tax 
holiday did not have this effect.  Even firms that showed some evidence of being financially 
constrained or that explicitly lobbied for the tax holiday did not increase domestic investment, 
employment or R&D.  Moreover, around the time of the HIA, repatriations were positively 
associated with new parent equity provisions to foreign affiliates, suggesting that parent 
companies substituted new paid-in capital for reinvested earnings to take advantage of the tax 
holiday and repatriate.  This “roundtripping” behavior is also inconsistent with the view that 
parent operations were financially constrained.   
 
Second, this paper’s results indicate that U.S. multinationals are reasonably well-governed.  If 
U.S. multinationals had serious agency problems, then managers would have been likely to 
respond to the ability to access cash at a lower cost under the HIA in ways to maximize their 
private return instead of shareholder value.  For example, managers may have increased their 
own compensation or engaged in empire building through acquisitions or investment. 
Managers might also have reduced external debt in order to reduce future constraints on their 
operations by reducing their fixed obligations. The results indicate that increases in 
repatriations under the HIA did not have these effects.  Instead, the estimates imply that every 
extra dollar of repatriated cash was associated with an increase of $0.92 in payouts to 
shareholders, largely in the form of share repurchases.  Although this response was 
concentrated among firms characterized by stronger corporate governance, the results indicate 
that agency problems were not significant, on average, in the full sample of firms.  
 
Third, the results in this paper have important implications for U.S. international tax policy.  
Discussion of reforming the U.S. tax code often includes a debate on whether reducing or 
eliminating the taxation of foreign earnings for U.S. multinationals would have any effect.  
Some commentators argue that changes to repatriation taxes would have little impact because 
there are numerous ways around these taxes.  However, the substantial impact of the HIA on 
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repatriations – especially among firms that appear to have previously attempted to reduce 
their repatriation taxes through tax planning strategies – indicates that the relatively high U.S. 
tax rate, coupled with the ability to defer paying taxes on foreign earnings until they are 
repatriated, provide incentives for firms to keep foreign profits abroad.  
 
Fourth, the results do not provide evidence of a “flypaper” effect for firms. A key goal of the 
HIA — and the broader series of tax changes in the AJCA — was to promote investment and 
employment in the United States.  The HIA and corresponding regulations included specific 
guidelines on how cash repatriated at the lower tax rate could be used in order to ensure that 
repatriations were mainly used to further these goals.  This paper clearly shows, however, that 
these guidelines were ineffective in achieving these specific goals.  Estimates imply that firms 
returned almost all of the repatriated cash to shareholders — a use that was explicitly not 
permitted. It is important to emphasize that the results do not imply that firms violated any of 
the provisions of the HIA. Rather, they reflect the fact that cash is fungible and that a tax 
policy which reduces the cost of accessing a particular type of capital will have difficulty 
affecting how that capital is used.  This interpretation is supported by survey evidence in 
Graham, Hanlon and Shevlin (2008a). Firms report that they used the repatriated cash in a 
manner consistent with the HIA regulations, but the repatriations “freed up” cash to use for 
other purposes. Thus, the overall effect of what firms did differed from what their public 
statements indicated and from what the regulations intended. 
 
Although the HIA does not appear to have spurred the domestic investment and employment 
of firms that used the tax holiday to repatriate earnings from abroad, it may still have 
benefited the U.S. economy in other ways.  The tax holiday encouraged U.S. multinationals to 
repatriate roughly $300 billion of foreign earnings and pay most of these earnings to 
shareholders.  Presumably these shareholders either reinvested these funds or used them for 
consumption.28  Either of these activities could have an effect on U.S. growth, investment, and 
employment. 
 
                                                 
28 See Auerbach and Hassett (1991) and Poterba (1991) for evidence on the extent to which shareholders 
consume out of corporate payouts. The HIA primarily led to a change in the timing of payouts to shareholders, 
but there is some evidence that the timing of income may affect consumption, as in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995). 
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Finally, the results in this paper suggest several related questions for future research.  First, 
what are the dynamic effects of tax holidays on repatriations?  Will companies repatriate less 
in the years immediately following the tax holiday as they hope to receive another “one-time” 
tax holiday in the future?  This concern may have recently increased as Congress seriously 
debated another tax holiday on repatriations as part of the fiscal stimulus package enacted in 
2009.  Second, while the 2005 tax holiday occurred at a time of abundant credit, could a 
similar tax holiday during the current crisis have a different effect because firms may now 
face greater financial constraints?  Both of these questions will be useful extensions when 
more data become available. 
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Transactions Accounts Data, Table 7b, line 3 for distributed earnings. 2006 data are preliminary.
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Figure 2
Mean Repatriations for Different Types of U.S. Multinationals
Low Benefits from Tax Holiday
High Benefits from Tax Holiday
Notes: The sample used to construct this figure includes the balanced panel of firms for which data are available from 2001-
2005.  The dashed line displays mean repatriations for firms that are expected to have high benefits from a tax holiday.  Firms 
are expected to have high benefits from the tax holiday if, in 2004, they (a) face lower corporate tax rates abroad and (b) have an 
affiliate that is a holding company or in a tax haven.  The solid line displays mean repatriations for firms that do not meet either 
of these criteria.
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Repatriations/Lagged Assets 0.0073 0.0223
U.S. Capital Expenditures/Lagged Assets 0.0393 0.0423
U.S. Employment Compensation/Lagged Assets 0.1998 0.2248
R&D/Lagged Assets 0.0346 0.0539
Change in Parent Debt/Lagged Assets 0.0381 0.1982
Change in Consolidated Net PPE/Lagged Assets 0.0188 0.0852
CEO Compensation/Lagged Assets 0.0023 0.0034
Payouts/Lagged Assets 0.0428 0.0638
Dividends/Lagged Assets 0.0141 0.0220
Repurchases/Lagged Assets 0.0278 0.0554
Lagged Leverage 0.2103 0.2097
Lagged Tobin's q 2.0363 1.4574
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets 0.1130 0.1398
Lagged Profitability 0.0397 0.1039
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis that follows.  Many of these are scaled by lagged 
consolidated assets, which measures total firm assets.  Repatriations are earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent.  U.S. 
Capital Expenditures measures U.S. MNE investment in the United States, and U.S. Employment Compensation is the value of cash and 
benefit payments to U.S. employees.  R&D is the aggregate research and development expenditures of a firm.  Change in Parent Debt is 
calculated as the first difference of the sum of parent company liabilities.  Change in Consolidated Net PPE is the first difference of 
aggregate firm net property, plant, and equipment.  CEO compensation includes salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants.  
Dividends measure cash dividends paid by firms to shareholders, and repurchases measure purchases of common and preferred stock.  
Payouts are equal to the sum of dividends and repurchases.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market 
value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book 
value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  
Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)
0.0128** 0.0127**
(0.0030) (0.0030)
0.0068** 0.0066**
(0.0028) (0.0027)
-0.0025
(0.0027)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0098*
(0.0057)
Lagged Profitability -0.0053
(0.0049)
Firm and year dummies? Y Y
No. of Obs. 4,921 4,921
R-Squared 0.0562 0.0580
F-Statistic for Instruments 10.91 10.92
Table 2
Lagged Tobin's q
High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy * 2005 
Dummy
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Notes: The dependent variable is the earnings repatriated by foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  The 
High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's 
foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm 
assets.  For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise.  The 
Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding 
company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years.  Leverage is the ratio 
of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets 
plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of 
Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash 
holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each 
specification is an OLS specification that includes firm and year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct 
for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. F-statistic for Instruments indicates the results of Wald tests for the joint 
significance of the instruments following Stock and Yogo (2005). ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Lagged Leverage
First-Stage Regressions
Dividend Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Haven or Holding Company Dummy * 2005 
Dummy
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0212 0.0033 0.0097 -0.2345 0.0147 -0.1454
(0.0268) (0.1272) (0.0538) (0.5258) (0.0238) (0.1242)
-0.0409** -0.0409** -0.1639** -0.16444** -0.0073* -0.0077*
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0039) (0.0040)
0.0032** 0.0032** 0.0114** 0.0113** 0.0069** 0.0068**
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0013)
-0.0086 -0.0084 -0.1031** -0.1003** -0.0262** -0.0243**
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0386) (0.0368) (0.0123) (0.0128)
Lagged Profitability 0.0223** 0.0222** -0.0528** -0.0541** 0.0103* 0.0095
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0234) (0.0239) (0.0059) (0.0061)
Firm and year dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument with Haven or Holding Company 
Dummy * 2005 Dummy and High Tax Costs of 
Repatriation Dummy * 2005 Dummy? N Y N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 4,508 4,508 4,508 4,508 4,921 4,921
R-Squared 0.1645 0.1161 0.1159
R&D/                         
Lagged Assets
Table 3
The Effects of Repatriations on U.S. Capital Expenditures, U.S. Employment Compensation, and R&D
U.S. Capital Expenditures/         
Lagged Assets
U.S. Employment Compensation/ 
Lagged Assets
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the ratio of domestic capital expenditures by U.S. MNEs to lagged consolidated assets.  In columns 3-4 it is the ratio of U.S. employment 
compensation to lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5-6 it is research and development expenditures scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings 
repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is 
calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q 
are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of 
consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects.  The specifications in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in 
columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding 
Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy.   The High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's 
foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, 
the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise.  The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a 
holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering 
at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Lagged Leverage
Lagged Tobin's q
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.2019 -0.1195 0.0719 0.2855 -0.0019 0.0027
(0.2171) (1.0324) (0.0899) (0.3846) (0.0021) (0.0176)
-0.3342** -0.3341** -0.1656** -0.1651** -0.0035** -0.0035**
(0.0518) (0.0515) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.0075* 0.0075* 0.0085** 0.0086** 0.0004** 0.0004**
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0781 0.0767 0.0975** 0.0940** 0.0010 0.0009
(0.0685) (0.0713) (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Lagged Profitability 0.0732 0.0735 0.0753** 0.0761** 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0663) (0.0661) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Firm and year dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument with Haven or Holding Company 
Dummy*2005 Dummy and High Tax Costs of 
Repatriation Dummy *2005 Dummy? N Y N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 4,176 4,176 4,580 4,580 3,049 3,049
R-Squared 0.0702 0.1185 0.0646
Table 4
The Effects of Repatriations on Parent Debt, Consolidated Net PPE, and CEO Compensation
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the first difference of parent liabilities scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  In columns 3-4 it is the first difference of consolidated net property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5-6 it is CEO compensation, including salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants, scaled by lagged 
consolidated assets.  Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the 
sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the 
book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash 
holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects.  The specifications 
in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of 
Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy.  The High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 
2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled 
by total firm assets.  For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise.  The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal 
to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other 
years.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Change in Consolidated Net PPE/   
Lagged Assets
Change in Parent Debt/           
Lagged Assets
CEO Compensation/             
Lagged Assets
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Lagged Leverage
Lagged Tobin's q
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.1018* 0.9244** 0.0102 0.1546 0.0882* 0.7893**
(0.0589) (0.4192) (0.0127) (0.1082) (0.0511) (0.3606)
-0.0389** -0.0363** -0.0176** -0.0172** -0.0144* -0.0124
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0086) (0.0090)
0.0038** 0.0042** -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0049** 0.0052**
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0015)
0.0707** 0.0605** 0.0121* 0.0105 0.0544** 0.0450**
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Lagged Profitability 0.0486** 0.0522** 0.0094** 0.0101** 0.0406** 0.0440**
(0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0086) (0.0102)
Firm and Year Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument with Haven or Holding Company 
Dummy*2005 Dummy and High Tax Costs of 
Repatriation Dummy*2005 Dummy? N Y N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 4,581 4,581 4,848 4,848 4,649 4,649
R-Squared 0.0796 0.0489 0.0675
Repurchases/                   
Lagged Assets
Payouts/                       
Lagged Assets
Lagged Tobin's q
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the ratio of cash dividends to lagged consolidated assets; in columns 5-6 it is the ratio of repurchases of common and preferred shares to lagged 
consolidated assets, and in columns 1-2 it is the sum of these two.  Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated 
assets.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm 
equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets 
measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each specification includes 
firm and year fixed effects.  The specifications in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for 
Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy.   The 
High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax 
rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero 
otherwise.  The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero.  
The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote 
significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 5
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Lagged Leverage
The Effects of Repatriations on Dividends and Repurchases
Dividends/                     
Lagged Assets
Measure of Financial Constraints: KZ Index Payouts Bond Ratings
(1) (2) (3)
All Firms 34.0% 48.1% 89.0%
Multinational Firms 26.5% 42.0% 84.9%
Non-Multinational Firms 37.0% 50.4% 90.3%
Table 6
Share of Firms Facing Financial Constraints
Notes: This table displays the share of Compustat firms that appear to face financial constraints in 2004, using three different measures 
of constraints.  In column 1, firms are identified as being financially constrained if their KZ index, computed following the technique in 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), is among the bottom one third of Compustat firms.  In column 2, firms are identified as being financially 
constrained if they do not pay dividends to common or preferred shareholders or repurchase shares.  In column 3, firms are 
characterized as being financially constrained if their S&P long-term debt rating is below BBB or if they do not have a rating.  
Multinational Firms are those firms that report pretax foreign income (data item 273).
Dependent Variable:
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0292 0.0549 -0.0949 -0.0027 -0.5390 0.1623
(0.9624) (0.1619) (0.7079) (0.1135) (0.3974) (0.1091)
Controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm and Year Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instruments? Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 1,021 2,917 927 3,360 2,790 1,718
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.2031 -0.0304 0.0609 -0.2248 0.1107 -0.1361
(0.3505) (0.1606) (0.1125) (0.2993) (0.1444) (0.1991)
Controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm and Year Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instruments? Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 236 4,272 1,083 3,413 732 3,769
Increase in 2003-04
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Table 7
Financial Constraints, Lobbying, and the Effects of Repatriations on U.S. Capital Expenditures
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of domestic capital expenditures by U.S. MNEs to lagged consolidated assets.  
Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Controls 
include lagged leverage, lagged Tobin's q , lagged cash/lagged assets, and lagged profitability.  Each specification includes firm and year 
fixed effects.  The specifications are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of 
Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy.  The High 
Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign 
pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  For firms 
with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise.  The Haven or Holding 
Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding company abroad and is 
otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years.  The top panel examines subsamples of firms 
that do and do not appear to face financial constraints.  The samples in the first two columns, respectively, include firms with a KZ index, 
computed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) using 2004 data, that is among the bottom third of all Compustat firms and firms with 
higher values of the KZ index.  The samples in the third and fourth columns, respectively, include firms that did not and did pay dividends 
or repurchase shares.  The samples in the fifth and sixth columns, respectively, include firms that had an S&P long-term debt rating below 
BBB or did not have a debt rating and those with a BBB or better rating.  The bottom panel presents results for subsamples of firms that do 
and do not appear to lobby for the passage of the HIA.  The samples in the first two columns, respectively, include members of the 
Homeland Investment Coalition and all other firms.  The samples in the third and fourth columns, respectively, include firms that made 
contributions to the Senate Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee in 2003 or 2004 and those that did not.  The 
samples in the last two columns, respectively, include firms that increased their contributions to the Senate Finance Committee or the House 
Ways and Means Committee in 2003-2004 relative to 2000-2001 and those that did not.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that 
correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
U.S. Capital Expenditures/Lagged Assets
Financially-Constrained Subsample: KZ Index Payout Bond Rating
Lobbying Subsample: HIC Member Contributor in 2003-04
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive Equity Provision Dummy -0.0005 -0.00010 -0.0012* -0.0013**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
0.0073** 0.0072** 0.0081** 0.0083**
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0031)
-0.0024 -0.0029
(0.0021) (0.0023)
-0.0004 -0.0007*
(0.0003) (0.0004)
0.0104** 0.0164**
(0.0048) (0.0057)
Lagged Profitability -0.0035 -0.0051
(0.0037) (0.0042)
Firm and year dummies? Y Y Y Y
Positive Equity Provision measured as concurrent value? Y Y N N
Positive Equity Provision measured as lagged plus concurrent 
value? N N Y Y
No. of Obs. 7,383 6,900 6,051 5,670
R-Squared 0.0350 0.0374 0.0417 0.0469
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Lagged Leverage
Lagged Tobin's q
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Table 8
Repatriations and Liquidity Provisions
Positive Equity Provision Dummy * 2005 Dummy
Notes: The dependent variable is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Positive Equity Provision Dummy measures parent firm 
investments of new equity abroad.  In columns 1 and 2 it is equal to one if the parent increased its equity investment in the year repatriations are measured and is otherwise equal to zero.  In 
columns 3 and 4, it is equal to one if the parent increased its equity investment in the year repatriations are measured or the year before and is otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to 
one in 2005 and zero in other years.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets 
plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged 
Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each 
specification is an OLS specification that includes firm and year fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and 
* denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Governance Subsample: Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.2921 0.0042 0.0049 -0.0001 -0.0523 1.0713**
(0.2665) (0.1558) (0.0181) (0.0222) (0.4011) (0.5057)
-0.0105 -0.0519** -0.0025** -0.0039** -0.0544** -0.0365**
(0.0151) (0.0103) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0228) (0.0162)
0.0012 0.0027** 0.0007** 0.0003** 0.0053 0.0050**
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0024)
-0.0618* 0.0004 -0.0026 0.0020 0.0537 0.0719**
(0.0355) (0.0180) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0375) (0.0223)
Lagged Profitability 0.0425 0.0246** -0.0004 0.0012 0.0983** 0.0486**
(0.0265) (0.0106) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0337) (0.0158)
Firm and Year Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument with Haven or Holding Company 
Dummy*2005 Dummy and High Tax Costs of 
Repatriation Dummy*2005 Dummy? Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 1,116 2,867 813 2,094 1,136 2,866
Lagged Leverage
Lagged Tobin's q
Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets
Payouts/                       
Lagged Assets
Repatriations/Lagged Assets
Table 9
Governance and the Effects of Repatriations on U.S. Capital Expenditures, CEO Compensation, and Payouts
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the ratio of domestic capital expenditures by U.S. MNEs to lagged consolidated assets.  In columns 3 and 4, it is CEO compensation, 
including salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants, scaled by lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5 and 6, it is the sum of cash dividends and repurchases of common and 
preferred shares scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets.  Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  Tobin’s q  is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the 
book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets.  Industry median values of Tobin’s q  are used if firm specific ones are unavailable.  Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged 
ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.  Each specification includes firm and year fixed 
effects.  The specifications are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or 
Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy.  The High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of 
a firm's foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  For firms with a ratio above the median sample 
value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise.  The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or 
use a holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero.  The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years.  The sample in columns 1, 3, and 5 includes poorly governed 
firms, or firms with values of governance, as measured in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), that are equal to or exceed 12.  Firms with stronger governance comprise the sample employed in 
columns 2, 4, and 6.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
U.S. Capital Expenditures/         
Lagged Assets
CEO Compensation/             
Lagged Assets
